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This paper reviews the application of tranexamic acid, an antifibrinolytic, to trauma. CRASH-2, a large randomized controlled
trial, was the first to show a reduction in mortality and recommend tranexamic acid use in bleeding trauma patients. However, this
paper was not without controversy. Its patient recruitment, methodology, and conductance in moderate-to-low income countries
cast doubt on its ability to be applied to trauma protocols in countries with mature trauma networks. In addition to traditional
vetting in scientific, peer-reviewed journals, CRASH-2 came about at a time when advances in communication technology allowed
debate and influence to be leveraged in new forms, specifically through the use ofmultimedia campaigns, social media, and Internet
blogs. This paper presents a comprehensive view of tranexamic acid utilization in trauma from peer-reviewed evidence to novel
multimedia influences.
1. Introduction
(1) The Study. The Clinical Randomization of an Antifib-
rinolytic in Significant Haemorrhage trial, also known as
CRASH-2, has generated an unprecedented amount of con-
troversy since its publication in 2010 [1]. This large, ran-
domized controlled trial (RCT), which was spearheaded in
England but performed in predominately low-to-moderate
income countries without mature trauma systems, proposed
that a bolus dose of 1 g of tranexamic acid (TXA) followed
by a 1 g infusion over eight hours should be given to bleeding
trauma patients. This trial’s mechanistic rationale originated
from TXA’s use in elective orthopedic, cardiac, and liver
transplant surgeries where its use led to a reduction of blood
transfusion products. This effect of TXA, which resulted in
its adoption in these operations, followed an extensive and
thorough scientific process, which took years to establish.
Based on this successful use of TXA in elective orthopedic
trials, for example, it was mechanistically logical to assume
that administration of TXA would decrease blood product
use in trauma, obstetrics, and other situations of massive
blood loss. It was with this rationale that the CRASH-2 trial
was undertaken [1].
(2) The Controversy. The controversy regarding this revival
of an older and inexpensive drug in the setting of trauma
has coincided with a meteoric rise of social media sites not
vetted by standard peer review that, when combined with the
multimedia campaign by theNational Health Services (NHS)
for TXA’s ubiquitous use in trauma, has led to a spirited
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controversy both in peer-reviewed scientific publications and
throughout social media forums [2–9].
(3) The Purpose of This Paper. This paper seeks to analyze
the scientific and historical underpinnings of the CRASH-
2 trial and to contrast the peer-reviewed reaction to the
reaction by social media and medical education sites driven
by supporters in England and elsewhere. This controversy
will be traced from the origins of the CRASH-2 trial in
2010 to current reviews, non-RCTs, and RCTs that have been
proposed to address the well-described “knowledge gaps” of
the CRASH-2 trial [10–24].
2. History of TXA Use Preceding
the CRASH-2 Trial
(1) TXA, a synthetic lysine derivative that blocks the
lysine site on plasminogen and inhibits fibrinolysis, was
first described in 1966. Its first application demonstrated a
reduction of menstrual bleeding in 1968. The use of TXA to
reduce bleeding was described in many surgical and medical
settings, which were expanded from the 1970s to include dys-
functional uterine bleeding, refractory thrombocytopenia,
hemophilia, and vonWillebrand’s disease. Of importancewas
the adoption of TXA to treat cardiopulmonary bypass and
liver transplantation-associated hyperfibrinolysis. In these
settings, TXA was shown to reduce blood loss and the need
for transfusion. Finally, TXA was shown to reduce bleeding
and blood transfusion requirements without an increase in
thrombosis in patients undergoing elective hip and knee
arthroplasty [14, 25–27].
3. Findings of the CRASH-2 Trial
(1) CRASH-2 was a randomized, placebo-controlled trial that
spanned 274 hospitals in 40 countries that sought to assess
“the effects of the early administration of a short course of
tranexamic acid on death, vascular occlusive events, and the
receipt of blood transfusion in trauma patients” [1].
(2) Adult trauma (>16 years) patients with significant
hemorrhage (systolic blood pressure<90mmHgor heart rate
>110 beats permin, or both), or whowere considered to be “at
risk of significant hemorrhage” were eligible for the study.
(3) Randomization was governed by “the uncertainty
principle.” The authors described this method stating,
“patients for whom the responsible doctor considered that
there was a clear indication for tranexamic acid were not
randomly assigned. Similarly, patients for whom there was
considered to be a clear contraindication to tranexamic acid
treatment were not randomly assigned. However, when the
responsible doctor was substantially uncertain as to whether
or not to treat with this agent, these patients were eligible for
randomization” [1].
(4) The trial included 20,211 patients with 10,096 in the
TXA arm and 10,115 in the placebo arm. After subtracting
those who withdrew consent and were lost to follow-up, the
TXA arm had 10,060 and the placebo 10,067 patients.
(5) TXA was administered as 1 g bolus given over 10
minutes followed by an infusion of 1 g over 8 h.
(6) Primary outcomewas death in hospital within 4weeks
of injury categorized as bleeding, vascular occlusion, mul-
tiorgan failure, head injury, or other. The primary outcome
of overall mortality was reduced with tranexamic acid (T
14.5% versus P 16.0%, 𝑝 = 0.0035, Number Needed to Treat
[NNT] 67). The mortality due to bleeding was also found to
be reduced (T 4.9% versus P 5.7%, 𝑝 = 0.0077, NNT 119).
(7) Secondary outcomes were vascular occlusive events,
surgical intervention, blood product transfusion, and num-
ber of transfused units. The results showed no statistical
difference in the number of vascular occlusive events (T 1.7%
versus P 2.0%, 𝑝 = 0.084), the need for any surgery (T 47.9%
versus P 48.0%, 𝑝 = 0.79), transfusion of blood products (T
50.4% versus P 51.3%, 𝑝 = 0.21).
(8) The authors also point out that “the trial inclusion
criteria were clinical and did not depend on the results of
laboratory tests” [1].
4. Peer-Reviewed Critique
The CRASH-2 trial has been scrutinized on a number of
fronts starting soon after its release in June 2010 (Tables 1–4).
(1) One of the first to question the CRASH-2 trial and
its results was the military trauma surgeon, Dr. Schreiber,
who warned against the ubiquitous and indiscriminate use
of hemostatic adjuncts such as factor VIIa, prothrombin
complex concentrate, and TXA for trauma resuscitation at
the 2010 NIH Conference section on the Current Practice of
Medicine for Severe Bleeding [28].
(2)The review by Cap et al. was one of the first to analyze
the CRASH-2 trial, its findings, and the application of TXA
use in trauma in July of 2011 in the Journal of Trauma,
Injury, Infection and Critical Care [14]. The authors address
several complaints that were circulating about the CRASH-2
trial. One of these complaints was the use of the uncertainty
principle for randomization. They defend this method of
patient recruitment stating, “[a]lthough this designmay seem
to introduce excessive physician discretion in determining
patient eligibility, it should be clear that clinical equipoise
could be the only ethical basis for enrolling patients in the
study” [14]. They further explain that excluding patients in
whomTXAwas clearly indicated would actually decrease the
study’s ability to reveal a benefit from TXA, stating “the fact
that a benefit was observed despite this exclusion suggests
a strong treatment effect” [14]. A shortcoming of the study
highlighted by the authors is the lack of laboratory moni-
toring of coagulation functions, which might have helped to
elucidate the mechanism of TXA that is not obvious since
its administration did not impact transfusion requirements.
The authors also address the absence of Injury Severity Scores
(ISS) of patients by arguing that it is unnecessary as it is
retrospectively assigned, does not affect randomization, and
does not reflect the amount of hemorrhage associated with
the specific injury [14]. Cap et al. acknowledge the validity of
the CRASH-2 findings stating, “this study was performed in
a rigorous manner that reflected real-world clinical practice
across a wide variety of settings, including austere envi-
ronments”; however, while recommending implementation
of TXA in the trauma protocol, they also urge “[f]urther
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Table 1: Randomized controlled trials involving TXA use.
Study Author(s) Description Year Outcomes Recommendations
CRASH-2 [1] Shakur et al.
20,211 pts with
recruitment by
“uncertainty principle”
2010
All-cause mortality
14.5% tranexamic acid
(TXA) group versus
16.0% placebo group,
𝑝 = 0.0035; vascular
occlusion 0.3% TXA
group versus 0.5%
placebo group, 𝑝 = 0.096
Tranexamic acid
should be used in
bleeding trauma
patients
PATCH [10] Gruen et al.
1184 pts in shock
determined by COAST
criteria
July 2014 start date Ongoing study
STAAMP [11]
Universities of
Pittsburgh, Rochester,
Texas at San Antonio,
and Utah
1000 pts with prehospital
shock and nonshock July 2015 start date Ongoing study
TAMPITI [12] Spinella andBochicchio
150 pts who received one
blood product and/or
immediate transfer to
OR
Fall 2015–Spring
2017 Ongoing study
Tranexamic Acid
in Orthopaedic
Trauma Surgery
[13]
Kiner 100 pts with orthopaedictrauma (hip or knee)
May 2012–Dec.
2015 Ongoing study
Table 2: Review articles on TXA use in trauma.
Title Author(s) Description Year Critique
Tranexamic Acid for Trauma
Patients: A Critical Review of the
Literature [14]
Cap et al. Systematic reviewof TXA 2011
Favorable towards CRASH-2 findings and
recommends use in combat situations and
bleeding trauma patients
Tranexamic Acid and Trauma:
Current Status and Knowledge
Gaps with Recommended
Research Priorities [15]
Pusateri et al.,
Department of
Defense
Systematic review
of TXA 2013
Identifies “knowledge gaps” in the CRASH-2
trial: (1) lack of clarity of reporting of
monitoring, complications, (2) no transfusion
benefit, and (3) data not robust
Tranexamic Acid in Trauma:
How Should We Use It? [16] Napolitano et al.
Systematic review
of TXA 2013
Major knowledge gaps: (1) recruitment, (2)
100% follow-up, (3) 50% received transfusion,
(4) survival benefit not a function of
transfusion, (5) TBI greatest cause of death, (6)
low rate of thrombosis, and (7) other
shortcomings noted
research on possible alternate mechanisms of action and
next-generation dosing regimens for TXA” [14].
(3) The MATTERs trial addressed some of the critiques
proposed by Cap: Following the initial above noted com-
ments about the CRASH-2 trial, the Military Application
Of Tranexamic Acid for Trauma Emergency Resuscitation
(MATTERs) trial was launched to address specific shortcom-
ings of CRASH-2, including its use of civilian hospitals that
lacked modern trauma systems, its lack of laboratory testing
to determine coagulopathy, its inclusion of a small number of
penetrating traumas, and, most importantly, its uncertainty
concerning the need for an antifibrinolytic agent in patients
where only half required transfusion and an equally small
amount required surgery. Importantly, the MATTERs study
sought to address several of those shortcomings by evaluating
those patients with a clear need for an antifibrinolytic by
including those who suffered combat-related injuries and
required at least one unit of PRBCs [17]. Unlike the subtle
CRASH-2 benefit, the MATTERs results were striking. The
NNT was 1 : 7 in the MATTERs trial while it was 1 : 67 in the
CRASH-2 trial [17]. The absolute reduction in mortality was
a very slight 1.5% in the CRASH-2 trial compared to the 6.7%
absolute reduction in the MATTERs trial [17]. In addition,
the mechanism for survival remains unclear in the CRASH-2
trial as half of the patients did not receive blood. In contrast,
in the MATTERs trial, all patients received blood and those
who received TXA required less blood products [17]. In the
CRASH-2 trial, TXA patients received the same amount of
blood as thosewho did not receive the drug [17].The question
remains, why include patients who probably will not need
blood products into a trial that tests the ability of TXA to
reduce blood product use [24]?
4 Journal of Blood Transfusion
Table 3: Nonrandomized controlled trials on TXA use in trauma.
Title Author(s) Description Year Outcomes Recommendations
Military Application of
Tranexamic Acid in
Trauma Emergency
Resuscitation
(MATTERs) study [17]
Morrison et al.
Retrospective
observational study;
896 pts with combat
injury and at least one
unit of PRBCs
2011
TXA significant survivor
benefit with reduced
blood utilization and
increased rate of VTE
TXA should be
incorporated into
trauma resuscitation
protocols for “severe
wartime injury and
hemorrhage”
Tranexamic Acid Use in
Trauma: Effective but
Not without
Consequences [18]
Swendsen et al.
Retrospective multi
cohort study; 126 trauma
pts, 93 straight to OR/IR
of whom 46 received
TXA
2013
TXA mortality benefit,
increased VTE, trend
towards increased AKI,
and no transfusions
differences
“In civilian trauma, early
TXA administration
confers early survival
advantage without
affecting blood product
usage but may increase
the risk of DVT/PE and
AKI”
Do All Trauma Patients
Benefit from Tranexamic
Acid? [19]
Valle et al.
Retrospective,
observational
single-center study;
1,217 trauma patients
requiring
OR/transfusions
2014
TXA group that had
increased mortality,
PRBCs, and crystalloid
“Prospective studies are
needed to further
identify conditions that
may override the
benefits from TXA”
Tranexamic Acid Use in
Severely Injured Civilian
Patients and the Effects
on Outcomes [20]
Cole et al.
Prospective cohort
study; 385 severely
injured (ISS > 15),
civilian pts. Focused on
131 shocked pts
2015
TXA mortality benefit
for shocked patients not
statistically significant;
increased rate of VTE in
TXA
TXA is recommended
for “severely injured
shocked patients”
Table 4: Editorials on TXA use.
Title Author Description Year Outcomes Recommendations
CRASH-2 Goes Viral [21] The Lancet Editorial(Internet) 2011
Reviews CRASH-2 media
coverage
Recommends TXA in
trauma
Antifibrinolytics in trauma
patients [24] Kenji Inaba
Editorial
(Internet/print) 2012
Reviews
CRASH-2 MATTERs
Cites CRASH-2
“challenges” and notes
MATTERs clarity
Trauma and Tranexamic Acid
[22] Gruen et al. Editorial (Print) 2013
Reviews knowledge gaps
noted by
Napolitano et al. and Pusateri
et al.
Recommends that TXA
be confirmed in future
RCTs
CRASH2, MATTERS. . .TXA in
Trauma [23] Mark Putland
Editorial
(Internet/ blog) 2013
Reviews CRASH-2
MATTERs, MATTERs II
Data for seizures and
thromboembolic
complications remain
incomplete. Needs more
study.
(4) Department of Defense (DoD) and subsequent trials
and reviews.
(a) Since February of 2013 there have been 2 reviews,
4 major RCTs, and several non-RCT studies launched to
identify and address the concerns with TXA introduced in
general terms by Dr. Schreiber. In the first of these reviews,
the DoD priority trial into TXA, coauthored by Dr. Ken
Mattox and others, the term “knowledge gap” was first
employed to describe the multiple inconsistencies of the
CRASH-2 trial [15].
(b) Soon after in June of 2013, the second review by
Napolitano et al. in the Journal of Trauma and Acute Care
Surgery meticulously outlined several major problems of
the CRASH-2 trial [16]. The first problem addressed is
the recruitment of patients according to “the uncertainty
principle” where “patients were included if the responsible
doctor was substantially uncertain about whether or not
to treat with tranexamic acid” [1]. Patients with clear indi-
cations or contraindications to tranexamic acid were not
randomized. This leads to the possibility of introduction of
selection bias [16].Thismethod leftmore than 20,000 patients
included in the study, who may or may not have needed an
antifibrinolytic, especially given the fact that no laboratory
measurements of fibrinolysis or coagulation were factored
into inclusion criteria which were completely “clinical” [1].
The second major flaw is the fact that only approximately 5%
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of patients had bleeding as a cause of death withmost of these
occurring early in the first 48 hours following the injury. All
other causes of death were the same in both groups with the
most common cause of death being traumatic brain injury
[1, 16].
There is also the inability to determine similarity between
the two cohorts as neither injury severity scores nor
shock status measured by lactate level or base deficit is
reported. These are important measurements because previ-
ous research has shown an increasing likelihood of hyperfib-
rinolysis with an increasing ISS while base deficit has been
shown to be an independent predictor of hyperfibrinolysis
[16].
Another problem is the small sample size of hypotensive
(SBP < 90mmHg) (31.5%) and tachycardic (HR > 107) (48%)
patients, who were the primary target populations [16].
In addition, TXA administration was not associated with
reduced blood transfusion. Only 50% of patients received
blood transfusions, which highlights the flaw of using the
uncertainty principle as the fundamental entry criteria as it is
uncertain whether any of the patients actually needed TXA.
Furthermore, no information is provided concerning the
administration of other blood products, such as plasma or
platelets, which further confounds the results and blurs the
ability to claim similarity between the cohorts.
There is also a concern for inadequate reporting as
“adverse events that were serious, unexpected, and suspected
to be related to the study treatment were reported separately”
and not on the outcome forms. Moreover, the study has a
“difficult to believe” 100% follow-up as the trial spanned 274
hospitals in 40 countries. Finally, there was a small effect size.
Although the results were statistically significant, they are not
clinically meaningful as the study determined only a 0.8%
absolute reduction in “death caused by bleeding” [1].
(c) Also in 2014, an ongoing RCT in Australia by
Gruen et al. called the Pre-Hospital Antifibrinolytics for the
Coagulopathy of Traumatic Hemorrhage (PATCH) reiterated
the same complaints made by the MATTERs trial and
Napolitano et al. [10, 16, 17, 22]. The PATCH trial should
help clarify practical and mechanistic questions regarding
the use of TXA in trauma resuscitation. Using a 7-point
numeric system called the Coagulopathy of Severe Trauma
(COAST) score criteria, the trial selects hypotensive patients
who will probably require blood products [10]. Most of the
patients from this trial will have SBP less than 100mmHg
in addition to well-documented and significant pelvic and/or
abdominal injury [10]. One of the stated reasons to perform
the PATCH trial is that the results of the CRASH-2 trial may
not be applicable to economically developed countries where
patients are treated more quickly [10]. Even the authors of
the PATCH trial found the CRASH-2 trial problematic and
as justification for their study they address the same points
delineated by Gruen et al. [22]. The PATCH authors note
that “Thrombotic complications were reported very rarely in
the CRASH-2 study (PE, 0.7% of all patients; DVT, 0.4%)
probably because they were not actively sought in many of
the participating hospitals” [22]. In contrast, the MATTERs
study showed that rates of PE and DVT among patients who
received TXA were, respectively, 9 and 12 times the rates
among those who did not [22]. Gruen et al. even hypothesize
the mechanistic possibility that the 12- and 9-fold increased
rate of DVT and PE in the MATTERs trial may be caused by
TXA [10, 17, 22].
(d) Subsequently, in 2014, three trials were launched
to investigate and elucidate the mechanism of TXA. The
first, coming from the University of Pittsburgh, is the Study
of Tranexamic Acid during Air Medical Prehospital Trans-
port (STAAMP) trial [11]. The second is the Tranexamic
AcidMechanisms and Pharmacokinetics in Traumatic Injury
(TAMPITI) trial fromWashington University in Saint Louis,
whichwill analyze coagulation andproinflammatorymarkers
for those patients given TXA in trauma [12]. The last is the
recently NIH-registered study of TXA in acute orthopedic
fractures from the University of Tennessee [13]. Since early
2013, these RCT studies have been done to clarify the irregu-
larities surrounding TXA use and to bridge the “knowledge
gaps” that originated from the CRASH-2 trial.
(e) In addition to these RCTs, many smaller non-RCTs
were performed to analyze the benefits and risks of TXA use
in trauma. In September of 2013, Swendsen et al. published
results from a retrospective multiple cohort study “to explore
the effects of a treatment guideline for administration of TXA
to patients with traumatic injury at a U.S. level 1 trauma
center” [18]. They looked at mortality, transfusion require-
ment, thrombotic complications, and acute kidney injury
[18]. Patients who were included were 18 years or older, had
been injured in the past three hours, met triage criteria for
serious injury, and also had one of the following: hypotension
defined as SBP <90mmHg, activation of massive transfusion
protocol in ED, or direct transportation to the OR or IR
suite [18]. 52 patients received TXA while the 74 historical
controls did not [18]. Patients were analyzed based on TXA
administration, but in order to better match controls with
those receiving TXA, patients were further categorized based
on the need to proceed directly to the OR/IR suites [18]. Of
those patients who were transported directly to the OR, 46
received TXA and 47 did not [18]. This study showed a 24-
hour mortality benefit among TXA recipients (4.3% versus
19.1%, 𝑝 = 0.03), increased rate of DVT/PE (13% versus
0%, 𝑝 = 0.012), and a trend towards more acute kidney
injury (AKI) (28% versus 15%, 𝑝 = 0.12), but no difference
in blood product transfusion [18]. The authors conclude by
emphasizing the need for more research, stating “further
studies with a larger sample size in US trauma populations
would be useful” because of the “unclear” reason why TXA
use is associated with increased thrombotic complications
and to further elucidate “the impact of TXA on cerebral
edema. . . and acute kidney injury” [18]. Finally, the authors
note that they “are still at a loss to reconcile our data
with the elective surgery data that shows the use of TXA
in elective surgery decreases blood transfusion” [18]. They
emphasize that there is still much unknown about the risks
and complications of TXA although its survival benefit is
once again confirmed [18].
(f) Subsequently, Valle et al. reflected a more nuanced
view of the CRASH-2 findings by publishing their experience
with TXA use in trauma at Jackson Memorial Hospital in
Miami, Florida, in the Journal of Trauma and Acute Care
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Surgery in June 2014 [19]. Their retrospective, observational,
single-center study, which by its nature is subject to selection
and surveillance biases, included 300 trauma patients who
required emergency surgery or transfusion of blood products
after being admitted to their level 1 trauma center [19]. 150
patients received TXA and were matched to 150 patients
who did not receive TXA using propensity scores based
on age, sex, traumatic brain injury (TBI), mechanism of
injury, systolic blood pressure, transfusion requirements, and
ISS [19]. Of these patients, 97% received transfusion, 78%
required emergency surgery, 75% required both surgery and
transfusion, 80% had a SBP <120mmHG, and 29% had a SBP
<70mmHg [19]. These patients were unique as they were all
in “severe traumatic shock” [19].The surprising finding of this
study was the increased Packed Red Blood Cell (PRBC) use,
increased total fluid requirements, and, most interestingly,
increased mortality among the TXA group when compared
to the propensity matched group [19]. The authors propose
a possible explanation for the increased fluid requirement
based on a known side effect of TXA. Rapid infusion of TXA
has been associated with hypotension. The authors propose
that TXA infusion might be exacerbating hypotension in
patients who are already hemorrhaging and hypotensive
from traumatic injuries. This hypotension would require
a larger dose of crystalloid [19]. Valle et al. conclude the
article suggesting the necessity of further research including
RCTs for TXA use in trauma in countries with modern
trauma systems as their research suggests that TXA increases
mortality in severely shocked trauma patients in settings
where there is immediate access to blood products as in
countries with modern trauma systems [19].
(g) Moore et al. and Harvin et al. have studied the
impact of fibrinolysis on mortality in trauma patients with
hyperfibrinolysis as measured by a rapid thromboelastogra-
phy (rapidTEG) and defined by the percent lysis measured
30 minutes after the maximum amplitude (LY 30%) >3%
[29, 30]. Harvin et al. found that TXA utilization was not
associated with reduced mortality [30]. They noted that the
rapidTEG is less accurate at identifying functional hyperfibri-
nolysis when compared to the kaolin TEG [30]. These results
further support the findings of Valle et al. questioning the
obligatory adoption of TXA, as advocated by the CRASH-
2 investigators, in advanced level 1 trauma centers with
immediate access to blood products for resuscitation and
emergent operative intervention [30]. Furthermore, Moore
et al. have described phenotypic patterns of fibrinolysis
using the rapidTEG and noted that “exogenous inhibition of
the fibrinolysis system in severely injured patients requires
careful selection, as it may have an adverse effect on survival”
[29].
(h) Finally, Cole et al., with CRASH-2 authors Davenport
and Brohi, have recently acknowledged the “evidence gap”
concerning the use of TXA in trauma in a study published
in February 2015 in Annals of Surgery [20]. They recognize
the limitation of the CRASH-2 trial stating that “the uptake
of TXA use in civilian trauma has been variable, in part due
to the difficulty in translating the results of these studies to
mature trauma systems, with differences in study popula-
tions, logistics, and resource availability” [20]. This criticism
has been raised many times prior to this acknowledgement
[16, 17, 22]. Similar toValle et al.’s retrospective, observational,
single-center study, which may be influenced by selection
and surveillance bias, Cole et al.’s prospective cohort study
is subject to a similar bias of small numbers and some
insignificant outcomes, which may be different with a larger
number of participants [19, 20]. Cole et al. analyzed 385
trauma patients admitted with an ISS >15, and patients were
separated into shock and nonshock groups based on a base
deficit ≥6mEq/L [20]. They were further divided based on
TXAadministration [20]. Among nonshocked patients, there
was no difference in mortality among the TXA and no TXA
groups [20]. Among shocked patients, the authors present
different mortality rates based on the unadjusted data versus
that arrived at by univariate analysis [20]. Based on the
data without statistical manipulation, the authors conclude,
“Unadjusted mortality rates between the 2 groups (shocked
patients who received TXA and those who did not) were
the same.” Concerning the shocked cohort, they add that
“[e]arly mortality rates for those who had TXA were lower.”
However, it should be emphasized that the unadjusted data
does not show a statistically significant difference in either
early or late mortality in the severely shocked patients even
though the absolute number of deaths was less in the shocked
patientswho receivedTXA [20]. A result from the unadjusted
data that was statistically significant was “a fourfold increase
in thromboembolic events in the TXA group” among the
shocked patients (TXA 8% versus no TXA 2%, 𝑝 < 0.01),
confirming the concern for increased VTE with TXA use.
The authors then performed a univariate analysis of the data,
concluding that “TXA was independently associated with a
reduction in MOF (multiple organ failure) and mortality in
shocked patients and greater numbers of VFD (ventilator free
days)” [20]. These statistical findings are presented because
the subtle benefits require attention to the details of the
analysis. What remains important, however, is that even with
the use of subtle statistical justification of their conclusions,
Davenport and Brohi, in the Cole et al. study, as CRASH-2
authors, have shifted from their previous position of nearly
universal use of TXA in trauma. They conclude the article
by stating, “on the basis of the findings from the severely
injured cohort in this study, it is difficult to recommend its
use in nonshocked patients within mature civilian trauma
systems” [20]. They ultimately recommend conditional TXA
use, stating that “the findings give a clear signal for using
TXA in severely injured, shocked civilian patients.” However,
careful analysis of their data suggests that TXA use in mature
trauma systems does not reduce unadjusted mortality rates,
further supporting the calls for more evidence on TXA use
in trauma prior to its universal adoption in protocols.
The percentage of VTE increased fourfold when compar-
ing shocked patients who received TXA and those that did
not and reflects the similar increase found in the MATTERs
trial, which was absent in the CRASH-2 trial [1, 17, 20]. In
this trial, VTE was looked for and “confirmed by either ultra-
sound scan (deep vein thrombosis) and/or computed tomo-
graphic pulmonary angiography (pulmonary embolism)”
[20]. In contrast, CRASH-2 was criticized for possible “inad-
equate reporting” as many speculated that there would have
Journal of Blood Transfusion 7
been increased thromboembolic phenomenon had these
complications been actively sought [16, 22]. This is even
more likely in light of the results of a small, non-RCT study,
including CRASH-2 authors, which confirmed an association
between TXA and VTE that was previously noted in an
orthopedic RCT using TXA in hip fracture repair [20, 31]. It
should be acknowledged, however, that the increased rate of
VTE in the Valle et al. and Davenport and Brohi el al. studies
in the TXA treated groupmay reflect the increasedmorbidity
of severely bleeding patients given TXA, which itself might
predispose to higher rates of VTE development as noted in
these smaller trials and the MATTERs trial [17, 19, 20].
5. From Science to Social Media
This controversy has been carried out not only in peer-
reviewed journals as outlined above, but also in highly influ-
ential social media forums and medical education websites,
beginning with the promulgation of the CRASH-2 data in
multimedia outlets.
(1) The CRASH-2 trial was published in Lancet in July
2010 [1]. Dr. Roberts, one of the authors of the trial, noted
in an interview that “[s]cience is good at getting at the truth,
but once you’ve found the truth, the methods that you use
with science aren’t very good at getting the truth remembered.
What we’re trying to do is get science to find the truth and
use art to remember the truth” [32]. With this rationale, he
began a campaign to increase the use of TXA in trauma
by turning to “more innovative than traditional methods”
[32]. These efforts spanned many multimedia milieus. One
use of art by Dr. Roberts came with the commissioning of
his nephew to make a Claymation Youtube video depicting
“TranMan,” a motorist bleeding to death after trauma, who is
saved by the administration of TXA [4, 33]. On his blog, Dr.
Robert’s nephew claims “that a prompt injection of a low cost
drug called Tranexamic Acid (TXA) could reduce death by
hemorrhage by 30%. Low profit drugs, such as TXA, do not
receive big advertising budgets; Dr. Roberts therefore hoped
a web video would help spread the word amongst Doctors”
[4]. Roberts also promoted TXA by writing lyrics for a song
performed by the Barking and DagenhamCommunity Choir
[5]. He then commissioned artist Emma Vieceli to create a
comic book promoting TXA use in a “mass-casualty” event
[3, 34].The comic book plot, mirroring a soap opera, includes
TXA use in victims of a bombing, a stabbing of an ED doctor,
and a romance between two doctors [34]. Concerning the
comic book, Roberts states, “We also tried to make doctors
giving tranexamic acid look sexier than doctors not” [3]. The
comic book was printed and disseminated “to all emergency
departments in the UK and many overseas” [32]. Finally,
because “reduction of the global burden of disease and injury
is an urgent moral obligation,” the authors of CRASH-2
launched a “Trauma Promise” campaign online, inviting
healthcare workers and institutions “to make a promise to
their communities that they will review the new evidence on
tranexamic acid and apply it to improve the care of trauma
patients” [2].
(2) In complement to Roberts’ efforts, many other media
sources also promoted or referenced TXA. The British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) featured TXA in its pre-
miere of the show An Hour to Save Your Life while the
American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) had an episode
of the Catalyst called “Thin Blood” focusing on TXA [6,
9]. TXA was even bolstered in the popular British medical
drama, Holby City in Series 16, episode 24 [7].
(3) CRASH-2 was debated in not only peer-reviewed
journals, but also online among medical education websites
and throughout social media forums like Twitter. Advances
in technology have given rise to online medical education
movements such as Free Open Access Meducation (FOAM)
[35, 36]. This important and particular movement started
around 2011 with the appearance of blogs focusing onmedical
education, and the term “FOAM” was coined in 2012 by Dr.
Cadogan, coauthor of the blog, Life in the FastLane [35].
FOAM consists of “a personalized, continually expanding
database of resources for medical education: podcasts, blogs,
videos, modules, Facebook groups and Twitter feeds” [36].
FOAM has exploded in the area of emergency medicine with
a proliferation of blogs, podcasts, and education sites [37–48].
These sites have served as a medium through which CRASH-
2 was also analyzed and debated. The discussion began with
literature analyses on several sites such as the EMCRIT
podcast with CRASH-2 author, TimCoats, andNNT’s look at
TXA where they note that the CRASH-2 trial was performed
in countries that “lacked [a] sophisticated trauma system,”
making it “[p]ossible that the benefits of this drug would
be lost in a more modern context” [49, 50]. However, NNT
still recommended TXA use as the “drug is inexpensive
and, based on this data, demonstrated no associated adverse
effects” [50]. A piece published in October of 2013 on the
Maryland Critical Care Project site entitled “How CRASH-
2 got it wrong” fueled a “FOAM firestorm” as many bloggers
weighed in on TXA and debated following this podcast [51,
52]. This eventually led to a rebuttal three days later entitled,
“How CRASH-2 got it right” by Dr. Weingart, also posted
on the Maryland Critical Care Project site [53]. Many EM
and trauma physicians also weighed in on the debate through
Meducation sites. For example, in 2013, Dr. Westafer, author
of “the short coat” blog, reviewed and supported TXA use
in trauma and noted, “many physicians do not know about
the drug as the inexpensive drug lacks a marketing campaign
from the pharmaceutical industry. This is where free, open
access, medical education (FOAM) may have a role in the
knowledge translation gap regarding TXA” [54]. In May
of 2014, Dr. Carley, of the virtual “St.Emlyn’s” blog, wrote,
“Here at St.Emlyn’s we are big fans of tranexamic acid in
trauma. . .We honestly believe that as the evidence stands, at
thismoment in time, you should give it. CRASH-2was a great
trial and the evidence is there. Seriously. Use it, it’s great” [55].
After stating his support of TXA, he proceeded to analyze
the study by Valle et al., noting, “[n]ot everyone is convinced
though. There is an RCT ongoing in Australia (PATCH trial)
and a number of other groups have raised questions too about
whether we should be giving it to everyone and when” [55].
In the same blog entry, Carley criticizes Valle et al. and rejects
the results of that study stating that “it’s not a great design,
the patient selection is unrealistic of clinical practice decision
making and the results are probably a function of these
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inherent biases,” specifically, “methodological bias” [55]. He
urges the continued use of TXA in trauma stating, “I implore
you please to not stop using a cheap and easy to administer
drug on the findings of this study” [55]. A summary of the
CRASH-2 trial with a description of the controversies that
have ensued has been published on WikEM under the title
“EBQ:CRASH-2 Trial” [48].
(4) Even expert researchers in trauma departed from the
pages of peer-reviewed articles and discussed the CRASH-2
trial on Twitter. Participating in the lively debate was one of
CRASH-2’s most influential authors, Dr. Karim Brohi, whose
groundbreaking research established the etiology of trauma-
induced coagulopathy (TIC) as a function of activated
protein C (aPC) mediated fibrinolysis. This aPC hypothesis
of trauma forms the foundation of the utilization of an
antifibrinolytic to treat TIC. Dr. Brohi and the Australian
traumatologist, Dr. Russell Gruen, debated the necessity
for further RCTs on Twitter outside the conventional peer-
reviewed confines. Dr. Gruen, author of the PATCH trial,
tweeted on September 13, 2013 “@karimbrohi @rfdsdoc in
my view NHS jumped the gun fast tracking TXA. I’d love it
2 b a great drug for us, just do not have evidence of it yet.”
Dr. Brohi replied back “@rustygroin @rfdsdoc I’m all for
PATCH. More than one RCT is important. But disagree with
the excuses against translation ofCRASH-2 results” (available
from https://mobile.twitter.com/karimbrohi/status/
374505742176632832). These important discussions
occurring casually and unchecked by peers via social media
may have unforeseen repercussions on professionalism and
productive scientific debate.
6. The Environment and
Economics of CRASH-2
(1) The final method utilized to promote CRASH-2 was an
appeal to the current topic of global warming. Subaiya and
CRASH-2 author andmarketing leader Roberts in their paper
“Reducing the Environmental Impact of Trials: A Compari-
son of the Carbon Footprint of the CRASH-1 and CRASH-
2 Clinical Trials” sought to audit and compare the environ-
mental impact of the Corticosteroid Randomisation after Sig-
nificant Head Injury (CRASH-1) and CRASH-2 as measured
by greenhouse gas emissions and overall carbon footprint [1,
56, 57]. The authors, in compliance with England’s National
Institute forHealth Research carbon efficiency guidelines and
in collaboration with Edinburgh Centre for CarbonManage-
ment, hired an independent agency to complete an audit of
the carbon use (electricity, natural gas, heating oil, flights, and
air freight) in several trial activities associated with the study
which included coordination center, trial-related travel, trial
teamcommuting, and freight delivery.The authors concluded
that the carbon efficiency associated with CRASH-2 was due
primarily to the decreased time frame of patient recruitment,
whichwas enhanced inCRASH-2 by the fact that recruitment
was done in Asia, South America, and Africa, where the
regulatory environment is less restrictive. Because CRASH-
1 trial data was entered by hand by two researchers, while the
CRASH-2 trial data was entered directly by computer onto
spreadsheets, they calculated a net deficit carbon footprint
of CRASH-2. However, perusal of CRASH-2 trial methods
section reveals that many of the centers did not have phones
for randomization, and therefore, the assumption is that the
data had to be either sent later by regular postal mail or by
fax from another phone. An important, unanswered question
is whether or not the energy consumption associated with
transmission of data to the coordination site in London
was included in the energy audit. The inexact estimation
and auditing of carbon emissions was another limitation
of Roberts’ energy study, which mirrors the problems with
CRASH-2 methodology, especially when CRASH-2 authors
express concerns for the low rate of “serious and unexpected”
thromboembolic complications associated with TXA.This is
further reflected in the inexplicable 100% patient follow-up.
The parallel of the two studies, CRASH-2 and the “Reducing
the Environmental Impact of Trials” paper, lies in the authors’
self-admitted underestimation of thromboembolic complica-
tions in the CRASH-2 trial and the unintentional underes-
timation of carbon emissions of the CRASH-2 trial as well
[1, 56, 57].
(2) The politics of the administration of TXA in trauma,
both in the UK and abroad, are not limited to the concern for
global warming but also extend to the realm of economics,
“urgent moral obligation” as mentioned above by Roberts,
and even a matter of “Social Justice” [2, 58]. The paramount
study concerning “Social Justice” in medicine is the 2010
Global Burden of Disease Study which prompted Roberts
et al. to use the proposed cost effectiveness of TXA to
spur interest in the CRASH-2 findings and seek acceptance
into transfusion protocols in trauma by making TXA more
politically and socially palatable [2, 59, 60]. Roberts states,
“[e]stimation of the global burden of disease and injury is
a challenging scientific endeavor. Reduction of the global
burden of disease and injury is an ‘urgent moral obligation.’
To reduce the human and economic effect of injury, we need
better prevention, effective and affordable treatments, and the
tenacity to ensure their universal access. For bleeding trauma
patients, we now have an effective treatment that is affordable
and widely practicable. . .. We have the evidence- we must
use it in the service of humanity” [2, 61]. Note Roberts’ use
of the term “urgent moral obligation” [2]. Physicians can
sign up on his “Trauma Promise” website where hospitals
that have allied themselves with CRASH-2 are listed, but
interestingly not a single hospital listed is from the United
States [2].Thanks in large part to themultifacetedmedia blitz,
CRASH-2 has had an influence on trauma care guidelines
in numerous organizations such as the UK NHS ambulance
service, the BritishArmy, and theUSArmy and has even been
included on the WHO Essential Medicines List [2, 60, 62].
Despite CRASH-2’s lack of methodological rigor perceived
by many traumatologists and the “knowledge gaps” and
“evidence gaps” as noted even by the authors themselves,
the political landscape that attributes immense importance to
environmental causes (e.g., global warming), “urgent moral
obligation(s),” and “Social Justice” has enabled the CRASH-2
findings to make their way into trauma bays [2, 15, 16, 22, 58,
61].
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7. Mechanistic Rationale of TXA and
Previous Precedents
7.1. LackingMechanistic Rationale. Lack ofmechanistic ratio-
nale has been noted for TXA use in trauma resuscitation
by trauma researchers in England, Australia, and the United
States. Previous use of TXA in orthopedic surgery was
associated with reduced blood product use suggesting a
possible antifibrinolytic mechanism for TXA [20, 27]. In
contrast, in the CRASH-2 trial, patients who received TXA
required the same amount of blood products as those who
did not receive blood, although the TXA group did have
a slight mortality benefit [1]. It has been proposed that the
anti-inflammatory effects of TXA may mediate this small
survivor benefit [20]. However, as CRASH-2 did not include
laboratory coagulation studies and included patients who
did not receive transfusion, there is no simple mechanistic
rationale that explains mortality reduction confined to a
three-hour window after which the drug has harmful effects
[16, 63]. One problem with giving an antifibrinolytic without
any markers for fibrinolysis is that there is no clear clinical
definition of significant fibrinolysis [64].
The clinical definition of significant fibrinolysis is not
standardized [14, 16, 65]. Currently there is experimental
work to predict clinically significant fibrinolysis by plasmin
antiplasmin (PAP) levels [66]. However, PAP levels, as a
manifestation of clinically significant fibrinolysis, may be
excessively sensitive in determination of fibrinolysis much as
the D-Dimer or Fibrin Split Product, rendering these sensi-
tive tests of little use in acute trauma. Furthermore, the range
of published clinically significant fibrinolysis varies widely
from 3% to 34% lysis at 30 minutes using TEG/ROTEM [67–
69].
Of final interest regarding the pathophysiology of TIC
there has been recent evidence by Campbell and Cap, and
Cap andHunt, concerning the effect of the platelet within the
context of TIC [70, 71].Theyhave demonstrated that activated
protein C (aPC) at low concentrations associated with TIC
is inactive due to preserved activity of platelet factor 5 [70,
71]. They similarly demonstrate that platelets can prevent
anticoagulant and fibrinolytic effects of aPC at concentrations
that have been described in patients with TIC [70, 71]. They
suggest that the cause of the elevation of aPC seen in TIC
may be a “downstream” marker for “robust” or “exuberant”
activation of protein C [70, 71]. They suggest that aPC is
not an anticoagulant in trauma since it does not prevent or
weaken the clot except at extremely high concentrations not
seen in trauma [70, 71].
It has been proposed that aPC is a major effector of TIC
through cleavage of factors Va and VIIIa. In addition, by
binding plasminogen activator inhibitor-1 (PAI-1) and dere-
pressing tissue plasminogen activator (t-PA), it may activate
fibrinolysis [72].Thismechanism is plausible but problematic
due to the kinetics of the reactions. Platelets and plasma factor
Va are resistant to aPC cleavage at concentrations of aPC seen
in TIC or even therapeutic use of recombinant human aPC in
sepsis [70, 71].
However, central volume hypovolemia induced by ortho-
static hypotension and experimental syncope in normal
subjects has been shown to result in increased levels of aPC,
t-PA, and increased lysis as determined by thromboelastog-
raphy. These findings suggest that fibrinolysis is part of the
hypovolemic pathophysiologic response to shock, but these
findings do not justify the use of TXA for the scientific
equivalent of the common faint, for example, [73].
7.2. Consequences of an Unknown Mechanistic Rationale and
Imposition of Large, Government Funded RCTs on Medical
Practice with Subsequent Retraction. Previously, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) funded National Acute Spinal
Cord Injury Study (NASCIS) promoted the indiscriminate
use of methylprednisolone to patients with cervical spine
injury with a prepublication printed mailing and facsimiles
to most emergency physicians’ homes and departments
in the United States in the early nineties [74]. Subse-
quently, this arbitrary administration of a “harmless” dose
of methylprednisolone to patients with cervical spine injury
based on this NASCIS study resulted in the inclusions of
methylprednisolone into countless algorithms and guidelines
[75]. Similar to CRASH-2, this study was a government
sponsored and financed enterprise with little mechanistic
rationale that described a subtle and equivocal benefit in
spinal-cord injured patients. It took more than a quarter
century for this study to be refuted with the description
of increased complications of severe sepsis and pneumonia
in patients who received the methylprednisolone [75]. As a
result, it is no longer “endorsed by major society guidelines”
[76]. For fear of repeating the past mistake of the NASCIS
trial by overlooking potential complications such as the
thrombotic complications noted in subsequent non-RCTs
by many traumatologists, including the CRASH-2 authors,
TXA’s implementation into trauma protocols may have been
delayed [19, 20, 76]. Ironically, the CRASH-1 trial revealed the
complications of steroid use in TBI, which was legitimized by
previousNASCIS recommendation of steroid use for trauma-
related neurologic injuries [57, 74, 77].
8. Summary
(1) In summary, TXA has been described in the CRASH-2
trial as a successful treatment for the reduction of mortality
in hemorrhaging trauma patients. The reduction in mor-
tality was subtle, and the mechanistic rationale was elusive
because of the absence of reduced blood transfusion products
in patients who benefited from the administration of the
drug. This large RCT, which was based on a reasonable
foundation of previously published non-RCTs and RCTs
concerning the use of TXA for bleeding patients, has not been
widely accepted in the trauma community due to perceived
problems regarding data collection and methodology. These
concerns by many respected trauma specialists have been
amplified by the unprecedented multimedia, social media,
and non-peer-reviewed medical and nonmedical publica-
tions by some of theCRASH-2 authors, which have advocated
for the near ubiquitous use of TXA in trauma. In addition,
the authors of the CRASH-2 trial have surreptitiously used
the CRASH-2 data to extoll the virtues of a reduced carbon
footprint in the CRASH-2 trial compared to the CRASH-1
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trial by publishing these findings in a peer-reviewed medi-
cal scientific publication. They describe the “environmental
wholesomeness” of CRASH-2 in a valid scientific journal
that meets the standards of peer review. Such fringe concepts
undermine the true utility of theCRASH-2 trial.Themomen-
tum to use steroids in neurologic injury following the NIH
funded NASCIS trial is a part of history that trauma surgeons
are reluctant to repeat. This history may contribute to the
previously noted delay ofwidespread implementation of TXA
in trauma [19, 20, 76].
(2) There is excellent mechanistic rationale based on
previous studies concerning the use of TXA in elective
orthopedic surgery, cardiopulmonary bypass, and liver trans-
plantation that theoretically supports the use of TXA for
bleeding trauma patients as proposed in the CRASH-2 trial.
However, the previously mentioned multimedia campaign,
social media debates, Meducation blog entries, and extra
medical publications by some of the CRASH-2 authors
have clouded scientific debate and created this interesting
controversy that is reminiscent of a previous debate con-
cerning the use of corticosteroids for neurologic injury that
was ironically ended by the CRASH-1 trial. This current
review is the first to describe for the CRASH-2 trial the
history of the phenomenon of multimedia, social media,
and non-peer-reviewed publications’ influence on scientific
discovery. This problem will become much more common
with the advancement of communication technology and
reliance upon non-peer-reviewed social media for medical
information.
(3) A prescient warning regarding the search for a simple
pharmacologic treatment for the hemorrhaging patient was
delivered by themilitary trauma surgeon,Martin Schreiber, at
the 2010 NIH Conference section on the Current Practice of
Medicine for Severe Bleeding, where he stated the following:
“Interestingly, and I think we learn this very, very well from
the Factor VII process, the use of these drugs may not be
justified based on the data that we have. And I am truly
hoping that we do not go through the same process with
prothrombin complex concentrate and tranexamic acid that
we did with Factor VII and then we get good prospective
randomized trials we find out that these drugs are not—really
are not indicated. And I think the bottom line here is that that
we really haven’t found a way to beat that qualified trauma
surgeon with the $0.50 silk suture.There are no magic bullets
when it comes to drugs for stopping bleeding” [28].
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